State v. Townsend Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 43553 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
3-14-2016
State v. Townsend Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43553
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Townsend Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43553" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5839.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5839
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 






























BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
________________________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
________________________ 
 





LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. O. Box 83720 






ELIZABETH H. ESTESS 
Deputy Ada County Public Defender 
200 W. Front St., Ste. 1107 

















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... ii 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1 
 
 Nature Of The Case ................................................................................... 1 
 
 Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ........................ 1 
 
ISSUE ................................................................................................................... 3 
 
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 4 
 
I. Townsend Has Failed To Demonstrate That The 
District Court Erred By Affirming The Magistrate’s 
Ruling That Exigent Circumstances Justified The 
Warrantless Blood Draw .................................................................. 4 
 
  A. Introduction ........................................................................... 4 
 
  B. Standard Of Review .............................................................. 4 
 
  C. Exigent Circumstances Justified The Warrantless 
   Blood Draw ............................................................................. 5 
 
II. If The Blood Draw Was Not Justified By Exigent 
Circumstances, This Court Should Remand To The 
Magistrate For Factual Findings And Application 
Of Currently Existing Law Regarding The Implied 
Consent Exception .......................................................................... 8 
 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 10 
 






TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008) .................................. 4 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) ............................................................... 5 
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) ............................................ 5, 6, 7, 8 
 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) .................................................. 5, 7 
State v. Arrotta, 157 Idaho 773, 339 P.3d 1177 (2014) ......................................... 8 
State v. Colvin, 157 Idaho 881, 341 P.3d 598 (Ct. App. 2014) ............................. 4 
State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 184 P.3d 215 (Ct. App. 2008) ......................... 4, 5 
State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 339 P.3d 368 (2014) ......................................... 8 
State v. Robinson, 144 Idaho 496, 163 P.3d 1208 (Ct. App. 2007) ...................... 5 





STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Thomas N. Townsend appeals from his conviction for misdemeanor DUI.  
Specifically, he challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Townsend with one count of DUI, second offense, and 
one count of failure to purchase a driver’s license, both misdemeanors.  (R., pp. 
6-7, 65-66.)  Townsend moved to suppress evidence of his blood alcohol content 
(“BAC”) obtained as a result of a blood draw.  (R., pp. 17-21.)  The magistrate 
found that Detective Weires pulled Townsend over after he drove “the wrong way 
into the oncoming east bound lanes of State Street.”  (R., p. 50.)  A “strong odor 
of alcohol” emanated from the cab of Townsend’s truck, “Townsend had glassy, 
red eyes, … his speech was thick-tongued and slurred,” he admitted he had just 
left a bar, and also admitted consuming seven beers.  (R., p. 51.)  Townsend 
failed all three field sobriety tests and Detective Weires arrested him for DUI.  
(R., p. 51.) 
 Detective Weires performed a breath test on Townsend, after waiting 15 
minutes to observe him, but Townsend stopped blowing on his first attempt 
(producing an insufficient sample) and “simply failed to exhale any air on his 
second attempt.”  (R., pp. 51-52.)   
Townsend stated that he was not going to comply with the test and 
that Weires would have to take his blood. Townsend was 
transported to the Ada County Jail to submit a blood sample. After 
arriving at the Ada County Jail, an Ada County paramedic drew 




polite and compliant and that he did not physically resist the blood 
draw. 
 
(R., p. 52.) 
 The magistrate denied the motion to suppress on two bases.  First, it 
found the blood draw appropriate under implied consent.  (R., pp. 54-56.)  
Second, it found the warrantless blood draw proper under exigent circumstances.  
(R., pp. 56-60.) 
 Townsend entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to 
challenge the denial of suppression on appeal.  (R., pp. 70-71.)  He appealed 
from the entry of judgment.  (R., pp. 64, 75-77.)  The district court affirmed the 
magistrate’s exigent circumstances holding without reaching the implied consent 







 Townsend states the issue on appeal as: 
I. Under the “Totality of the Circumstances” standard, Did the 
District Court Err When It Ruled That The Warrantless and 
Nonconsensual Blood Draw Was Justified under the 
Exigency Exception to the Warrant Requirement? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6 (capitalization original).) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Townsend failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by 
affirming the magistrate’s ruling that exigent circumstances justified the 
warrantless blood draw? 
 
2. If the blood draw was not justified by exigent circumstances, must this 
Court remand to the magistrate for factual findings and application of 







Townsend Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred By Affirming 





 The magistrate held that the warrantless blood draw was justified by 
exigent circumstances.  (R. pp. 56-60.)  The district court affirmed.  (R., pp. 148-
51.)  Townsend contends the lower courts erred because the DUI investigation in 
this case was “routine.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-12.)  Townsend’s request for a 
bright-line test is contrary to the very authority he relies upon.  Application of the 
“totality of the circumstances” test, as required by applicable law and done by the 
lower courts, shows that the warrantless blood draw was justified by the 
exigencies confronted by Detective Weires. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review 
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.”  State v. Colvin, 
157 Idaho 881, 882, 341 P.3d 598, 599 (Ct. App. 2014).  On review of a decision 
rendered by a district court in its intermediate appellate capacity, the reviewing 
court “directly review[s] the district court’s decision.”  State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 
709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 




record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to 
support the magistrate’s findings of fact and whether the magistrate’s 
conclusions of law follow from those findings.”  Id. 
 
C. Exigent Circumstances Justified The Warrantless Blood Draw 
 
 “[W]arrants are generally required to search a person’s home or his 
person unless ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law 
enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.”  Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978).  
Such exigencies include the “imminent risk of destruction of evidence.”  State v. 
Robinson, 144 Idaho 496, 499, 163 P.3d 1208, 1211 (Ct. App. 2007).  “To 
determine whether a law enforcement officer faced an emergency that justified 
acting without a warrant, this Court looks to the totality of circumstances.”  
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559 (2013).  In Schmerber v. California, 
384 U.S. 757, 768-69 (1966), the Supreme Court of the United States found the 
following totality of the circumstances to justify a warrantless blood draw because 
of exigent circumstances: 
Here, there was plainly probable cause for the officer to arrest 
petitioner and charge him with driving an automobile while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor. The police officer who arrived at 
the scene shortly after the accident smelled liquor on petitioner’s 
breath, and testified that petitioner’s eyes were ‘bloodshot, watery, 
sort of a glassy appearance.’ The officer saw petitioner again at the 
hospital, within two hours of the accident. There he noticed similar 
symptoms of drunkenness. He thereupon informed petitioner ‘that 
he was under arrest and that he was entitled to the services of an 
attorney, and that he could remain silent, and that anything that he 






 The magistrate applied the totality of the circumstances test.  (R., pp. 56-
57.  Among the circumstances considered was that it would have taken, “at the 
very minimum, one and one half hours” to get a search warrant.  (R., p. 59.)  The 
magistrate further considered that extrapolation of test results backward to the 
time of driving would not be available; that a test showing less than .08 would 
result in a legal bar to prosecution; the unavailability of other testing methods; 
and the possibility that a potential prosecution for an excessive BAC would be 
lost.  (R., pp. 58-59.)  The district court in turn concluded that the totality of the 
circumstances created an exigency that justified not seeking a search warrant.  
(R., pp. 148-51.)  Because the lower courts applied the correct legal standard to 
the totality of the circumstances shown by the trial court’s factual findings, they 
correctly held that the blood draw was constitutionally reasonable. 
 On appeal Townsend argues that this case is “identical” to Missouri v. 
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), “in that it was a routine DUI investigation.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)  There are two important distinctions Townsend 
overlooks.  First, in McNeely the state argued that metabolism of blood alcohol 
“creates an exigent circumstance in every case” and “did not separately contend 
that the warrantless blood test was reasonable regardless of whether the natural 
dissipation of alcohol in a suspect’s blood categorically justifies dispensing with 
the warrant requirement.”  133 S. Ct. at 1567-68.  The Court therefore did not 
reach the question of whether exigent circumstances were present in that case 
because “the arguments and the record do not provide the Court with an 




that can be taken into account in determining the reasonableness of acting 
without a warrant.”  Id. at 1568.  Because the Supreme Court never analyzed 
whether the facts in McNeely constituted exigent circumstances under the totality 
test, its opinion offers no guidance in this case.  
 An opinion that does offer guidance, however, is Schmerber, 384 U.S. 
757.  As set forth above, the totality of circumstances in that case was probable 
cause to arrest for DUI; a blood draw within two hours of the accident that 
garnered police attention; metabolism of the blood in his system; and an 
investigation of the DUI and the accident.  Id. at 768-69.  See also McNeely, 133 
S. Ct. at 1559-60 (discussing Schmerber).  Although Schmerber was transported 
to the hospital for medical reasons, the time-frames at issue for conducting an 
investigation and then obtaining a search warrant in that case and this one are 
very similar.  In Schmerber the investigation alone took almost two hours, which 
justified application of the exigency exception regardless of the time it might have 
taken to obtain a warrant.  In this case the investigation was shorter, but adding 
in the time to obtain a warrant would have taken the total time well beyond the 
two hours deemed sufficient in Schmerber. 
 Second, and more importantly, the Supreme Court’s analysis specifically 
rejects Townsend’s argument (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-12) that exigent 
circumstances cannot exist in a “routine” DUI investigation.  The Court 
specifically stated: 
Although the Missouri Supreme Court referred to this case as 
“unquestionably a routine DWI case,” the fact that a particular 
drunk-driving stop is “routine” in the sense that it does not involve 




accident, does not mean a warrant is required. Other factors 
present in an ordinary traffic stop, such as the procedures in place 
for obtaining a warrant or the availability of a magistrate judge, may 
affect whether the police can obtain a warrant in an expeditious 
way and therefore may establish an exigency that permits a 
warrantless search. The relevant factors in determining whether a 
warrantless search is reasonable, including the practical problems 
of obtaining a warrant within a timeframe that still preserves the 
opportunity to obtain reliable evidence, will no doubt vary 
depending upon the circumstances in the case. 
 
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1568 (emphasis added). 
 Townsend advocates for application of a “special facts” test that would 
make the exigency exception inapplicable in “routine” DUI cases.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp. 8-10.)  Although this was the standard applied by the Missouri court, it 
was specifically rejected by the Supreme Court.  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1568.  
Because Townsend’s claim of error is based on a legal standard squarely 
rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States, he has failed to show error 
by the magistrate or district court. 
 
II. 
If The Blood Draw Was Not Justified By Exigent Circumstances, This Court 
Should Remand To The Magistrate For Factual Findings And Application Of 
Currently Existing Law Regarding The Implied Consent Exception 
 
 In 2014 this Court reversed prior precedent and held that implied consent 
is constitutionally revocable.  State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 423, 337 P.3d 575, 
582 (2014); State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 646, 339 P.3d 368, 371 (2014); 
State v. Arrotta, 157 Idaho 773, 774, 339 P.3d 1177, 1178 (2014).  Because the 
magistrate did not have the benefit of these decisions, and was deciding the case 
on the basis of existing law holding that implied consent was not revocable, he 




implied consent.  He did find that Townsend was not blowing adequately for the 
breath test, and then “stated that he was not going to comply with the test and 
that Weires would have to take his blood.”  (R., p. 52.1)  This finding could be 
interpreted as Townsend withdrawing all consent, but is also consistent with 
refusing a breath test and instead insisting on a blood test.  Because the district 
court did not factually find whether Townsend had revoked his implied consent, if 
the lower courts are not affirmed on the exigency analysis remand for further 
factual findings is appropriate. 
 
                                            
1 The magistrate also noted Townsend’s testimony in this regard, but did not 
make any findings or credibility determinations: 
 
Townsend testified that he objected to the blood draw procedure 
and protested that the procedure violated his constitutional rights. 
These objections were not voiced to Weires, but could have been 
made to someone else at the Ada County Jail. Townsend further 
testified that jail staff told him that if he did not cooperate they 
would hold him down and take his blood. Townsend admitted that 
no one ever held him down. He stated that he never gave anyone 
permission to take his blood and that he did not physically resist the 
blood drawing. 
 
(R., p. 52.)  When asked whether Townsend “ever state[d] any objection to you 
or to anyone else there, any objection that he had to the blood draw” Detective 






 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Townsend’s conviction 
for DUI, second offense. 
 DATED this 14th day of March, 2016. 
 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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